Decommunization
in Romania
A
Case Study of the State Security Files Access Law
By
Ioana Borza
The
present paper explores the process of decommunization in Romania,
with special emphasis on the State Security Files Access Law. The
analysis is built upon a more theoretical basis concerning the definition
of transitional justice, the paths to achieve it and the understandings
given in the literature to the term decommunization itself. The
argument proceeds by making some general comments on the Romanian
transition, in connection with the nature of the former regime and
the way it was replaced. Further on, the paper takes a closer look
at the State Security Files Access Law in terms of content, context
of initiation and of adoption and more importantly, in terms of
impact upon the Romanian society. While the answer to the question
why after ten years is still unclear, the interpretation of political
discourse reveals a certain sense of duty in order for Romania to
be (considered) democratic, seen as a step forward in the European
integration process. In the same time, the analysis also points
out the clear reluctance of all parties in making a very powerful,
i.e. effective, lustration law.
Introduction.
The
process of transition from a totalitarian regime, the type that
Romania was, to a democratic one implies a series of choices regarding
the new institutions, the economic reforms, adopting a new constitution,
reframing the foreign policy, freedom for mass-media, judiciary
reform, and dealing with the past. It is particularly important
if the nascent democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should
or should not punish their predecessor communist regimes for the
crimes and actions committed against human rights. The discussions
around whether to deal with the past and how to do it were major
issues in the next years of the regime changes in almost all Central
and Eastern European countries, but the policy outputs were different
depending on a variety of factors like: the mode of transition,
the impact it has, the legacies of the past regime - the type of
the communist regime, the extent of political repression and penetration
of society by the state security forces -, the new political context,
the time when assuming the past became a political issue. There
are differences in the way, for example, Romania and ex-East Germany
dealt with the problem: the greatest efforts have been made in ex-East
Germany by creating a lustration law, by giving access to STASI
files, creating the Gauck Commission, by bringing in front of the
Judicial Court persons accused of crimes, while in Romania decommunization
was hardly talked about, and nothing was done until recently.
All
these differences challenged scholars to study if it is worth doing
justice in transition societies, what are the implications on the
new democratic regimes, what is the relation between decommunization
and democratization/consolidation of a democratic regime, and what
are the modes of achieving justice.
Transitional
justice
"Transitional
justice characterizes the choices made and the quality of justice
rendered when new leaders replace authoritarian/totalitarian predecessors
presumed responsible for criminal acts in the wake of the "third
wave of democratization""( R. Lewis Siegel). There are
different procedural modes of transitional justice:
- Screening laws or lustration: provide non-criminal
sanctions against those involved in police surveillance and other
detested activities of the former regimes.
- Truth commissions: have the role of disseminating
the names of alleged perpetrators and reveal the implications
of the findings for criminal prosecutions; give a sense of reconciliation
to a very polarized society.
Amnesty: ignores past crimes and violations
of human rights, and some say it is like starting anew because there
is no judicial procedure, and no public discussion about what happened
- Trials of the leaders who gave orders to
commit crimes, of those who carried them out, in a more brutal
way, of those who perpetrated abuses, of those who tortured and
prevented from liberty.
- Prosecutions carried out either by the
state, in a broader way, or by individuals, when it is narrow
and unfair, and can be transformed in a private way of revenge.
The
literature presents several arguments for and against various modes
of transitional justice, and I will shortly present them as it follows:
A. One of the purposes of prosecuting human rights
abuses from a previous regime is to prevent similar horrors from
being committed in the future. The judiciary, then, is being asked
to play three vital roles:
- To achieve some measure of justice for past deeds,
notwithstanding the political, social and economic maelstrom that
quite often is affecting societies attempting to transform themselves
into healthy democracies.
- To protect these societies from even having to
go through this suffering once again.
- To hold the national government to their obligations
under international human rights law.
Another purpose of prosecuting human rights abuses from a previous
regime is to eliminate people from the old regime who maintain positions
of influence to decide the rules of the new regime.
A. The arguments against any form of transitional justice are:
a.Prosecutions should be blocked entirely or in part because
in periods of transition, a state’s criminal and civic justice
are weak and incapable of performing such a highly moral duty
b.Prosecution tend to target the current political opponents
c.Lack of clarity about whether a given seemingly criminal act
is subject to current or past criminal law
d.Arguments for defending information crucial to national defense
or force major
e.Widely shared guilt and responsibility for the evils and crimes
of the previous regime
When
discussing transitional justice in Central Eastern European countries,
the term decommunization appears quite often. It can be interpreted
as a symbolic name, reminding of the process of de-nazification
carried out after the tragedies of the Second World War. In fact,
a considerable theoretical part of the decommunization literature
makes references to de-nazification. Decommunization is a process
of dealing with the communist legacies in terms of institutions
and personnel and it refers to wide ranges of actions carried
out either by the state, or by individuals in order to achieve
justice.
In
terms of institutions, decommunization represents "a transformational
process pertaining more to institutions and social structures than
to people. Resolving the conflicts included under this rubric was
a necessary first step in removing initial impediments to transition.
To ensure the smooth transition to democracy and the successful
transformation of the parties themselves into post-communist democratic
actors, this project needed to commence immediately." (Bertschi,
1995) In terms of personnel, it refers to defining and identifying
victims of the old regime, the abusers/criminals/torturers of the
old regime. It is a controversial matter because it deals with people,
their beliefs and values, which are judged publicly. The personnel
of each new democratic institution is supposed to be checked if
he/she was part of the state security institution - a lustration
law - and in this way, the new regime secures the circulation of
the elites. Each mode of transitional justice can be applied to
the process of decommunization.
Does
this process represent something for the new democratic regime?
How much information about the old regime should the new regime
disclose? The answers to these question are diverse, and largely
dependent on the respondents’ experiences during the communist period
and their political status at the time of the regime change.
Usually, in these new regimes, the group/groups formed from
the ex-communist elites have presented this process of decommunization
as an unfair "witch hunt," claiming that everybody was
in a way or another " contaminated" by communism, so everybody
should be punished. In many cases, ex-prisoners and ex-dissidents
present the process of decommunization as a desire for justice -
or even revenge - with punishment and compensation for the wrongs
committed under 40 years of communist rule. But as time passed,
these points of view have tended to soften. The process of decommunization
generally is no longer seen as a fight for life or death, but more
of a moral duty not to forget what happened so that it would never
happen again.
Decommunization
in Romania
Taking
into consideration this general overview, a closer look at
the decommunization process in Romania and a map of the motives
and goals of several actors –political parties and specific associations
in this process seems necessary.
Romania
was one of the last Eastern Europeans countries that began the transition
to democracy in 1989, not through negotiation of the " old
guard" and the "new comers", but in a bloody way
The way the transition was accomplished and the legacies of the
Romanian communist regime conditioned the course of future decommunization
attempts.
Romania
was a "sultanistc" regime during Ceausescu period with
a highly personalistic and arbitrary leadership, with strong dynastic
tendency—important figures of the political life were members of
the family, extreme glorification of the ruler, which was a despotic
personality, guided by pseudo-ideology with little power of mobilization,
the most important aspect is that his power survived because of
the Securitate. Securitatea, the Romanian state security institution
formed of different departments, one of which was the political
police, succeeded in installing the belief that the visible presence
of so many engaged in collaboration with the secret police represented
but a drop in the ocean of ubiquitous network of officers and informers.
The Securitate were as much a state of mind as the instrument of
state terror. Figures ranging from one in ten to one in three of
the population (2.3 to 8 million) have been frequently picked from
the air as an estimate of the Securitate’s strength, but none of
these figures has any solid basis of evidence to support them and
such numbers would have to include all the causal informants and
busybodies which all totalitarian systems produce in parasitic abundance.
Following
the sultanistic regime type, the transition was characterized by
the old elite largely remaining in power; decommunization in Romania
began with the summary trial and execution of Nicolae Ceausescu,
and then subsequent circus proceedings against members of Ceausescu’s
family. Some measures of justice were achieved in 1990 with the
convictions of a number of former Politburo members who ruthlessly
suppressed the anti-Ceausescu revolt that took place in 1989, during
which about 1,000 people were killed. However, despite the fact
that several of the defendants received life sentences, all were
pardoned in 1994 by then president Ion Iliescu, re-elected in 2000.
During 1990, much of the oppressive legislation of the Ceausescu
period was removed: freedom to travel abroad was initiated, the
death penalty abolished and all political prisoners were given amnesty
and some compensation rights for them or their widows, like a small
pension, free medical assistance and free travel by train or by
bus.
There
has been much talk about the changes made in the personnel of the
informational services, like the Romanian Intelligence Service,
the Foreign Information Service, the Counter-intelligence Directorate
and the Intelligence Directorate of the Army, and about their Securitate’s
legacy. Their activity is under the control of the Parliament and
of the Supreme Council for National Defense. All these are actions
conducted by the Romanian state in the process of decommunization.
Along
the state, there were some private initiatives like court trials
against county chief of Securitate, or a moral court trial against
communism. These actions were conducted by former-political prisoners
associations or trials against tortures in the communist prisons
conducted by the already dead political prisoners’ families. There
are also prisons kept as museums of torture - the one at Sighet-,
magazines published on the subject of communist period and suffering
of the prisoners, and a collection of books called "The Trial
of Communism" conducted by Humanitas publishing house.
The
remaining problem is the absence of state action, which affects
the process of decommunization because it gave it a twisted meaning:
it leaves open the way
- for personal revenge,
- for its politization in being used as a tool for destroying
political opponents’ careers,
- for revealing information which can not be proven true or false,
- for not making a distinction between victims and abusers
- there is no legal framework for dealing with the crimes and
abuses of the past regime and it seams they are still perpetuated.
These all represent violations of human rights norms.
The
passing of Access to ex-Securitate Files Law represents the only
serious attempt of the Romanian society to address the issue of
facing the past. There were some other legislative projects, but
none had either the juridical power, or were not even discussed
in the Parliament like the law which is the subject of this study.
Access
to the Personal File and Disclosure of the Securitate as a Political
Police Law
In
1990, in the first Romanian Parliament, Mr. Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu,
as chief of the Former Political Prisoners Association, made an
amendment to the Electoral Law, the one from March 1990, in which
he added, in a way similar to the Fascists Movements’ members, the
restriction for Communist party members to candidate, but his amendment
was not voted and hence it was removed from the law.
In
1992, after the first parliamentary elections in Romania, he was
elected as senator. So, he initiated a motion, a Parliamentary legal
act, which was a lustration law since it banned any person
who during 1945-1989 had worked consciously as informer of the Securitate,
delivering notes and information about other persons, to be elected
or to maintain a state office or an administrative or teaching position.
This motion was signed by 114 Senators and 200 Deputies and was
discussed by the Parliament and voted by the majority. It should
have functioned in a real democracy, but it was never even mention.
In
1993, Mr. Ticu Dumitrescu presented a legislative proposal with
the same content. It was never discussed in the Romanian Parliament
during 1993-1996. During the electoral campaign of 1996, the Romanian
Democratic Convention (CDR) made a promise of revealing the past.
Many voted for this promise. It was the biggest issue that separated
them from the PDSR party, which was the other serious candidate.
The
Law has 26 articles that can be grouped in distinct chapters.
The first chapter deals with the right of any Romanian citizen to
see his/her own file and to find out the identity of the Securitate
agents and of the collaborators who contributed with information
at the completion of that file.
The
second chapter presents the offices requiring a personal file check.
The
third chapter defines the political police as a structure
of the Securitate, set up for the establishment and maintenance
of the totalitarian communist power, as well as for the repression
or restriction of the fundamental human rights and liberties; it
also defines the agent of the Securitate organs as
any person who had the position of operative worker of those organs
during 1945-1989, undercover inclusive. The collaborator of
the Securitate organs is the person who was remunerated
or otherwise compensated for his/her activity in this capacity,
held a conspirational house or a meeting house, was a resident of
the Securitate, in the sense of the present law, any other person
who gave information to the Securiate, through which were affected,
directly or through other organs, the fundamental human rights and
liberties, or who passed on or facilitated the passing on of information,
notes, reports or other documents, by which the activity or attitudes
against the totalitarian communist regime were denounced, liable
to affect the fundamental human rights and liberties.
The
fourth chapter presents the National Council for the Study of the
Securitate Archives (CNSAS ):
its
legal status—an autonomous organ, a juristic person, subject to
the control of the Parliament;
its
components—like the College of the Council, formed out of 11 members;
its
main functions—verifying the persons running for offices subject
of this law, publishing the names of these persons, presenting personnel
file , studying the archives and administrating them.
The
fifth part establishes the right to privacy of the citizens who
are not running for any office. It is specified that publishing
information about a person without her/his permission, using information
twisted, hiding information is forbidden. All these deeds are punished
according to the penal law, the maximum punishment being increased
to 2 years.
Almost
all parliamentary political parties openly expressed no opposition
to the law, but all of them –both the ruling coalition( PNTcd, PNL,
PD) and the opposition ( PDSR, PUNR) –proved by their votes in the
Senat, in June 1998, that they want access to the files to be limited.
With a 109-7 vote, they changed the law so that the intelligence
agencies will remain the keepers of the files, and the CNSAS would
need their permission for any access. The access to a file is denied
if the information contained in this file represents a "national
security matter", and as the senators did not specified what
a "national security matter" means, it will be up to the
intelligence agencies to decide whether to reveal a file or not.
In the Deputies Chamber, almost all the parties supported the law
without or with amendements—like PNTcd, PNL, UDMR, PD, all these
parties presenting the law as a necessity for cleansing the Romanian
political life; they emphasized that the process of voting should
be quicker because it was already too late. PDSR supported the law
under the condition of a number of amendments to be accepted. Its
amendments were against the long list of offices that should be
checked, against the definition of the collaborator by trying to
restrict it to the definition of informer of Securitate, and against
placing the Archives with the CNSAS. PRM was totally against this
law; the reason was that it would bring great harm to the national
consent and to the Romanian intelligence services.
The
law has some important restrictions which determined some, including
its initiator, to say it will not have great impact on the cleansing
of the political life. The goal of the law was to permit access
to one’s own file, but CNSAS ccoul not answer these requests until
after the November 2000 elections. It did not have a great impact
on the local June elections because of the great number of persons
who ran for office and because of the CNSAS’s problems: it still
did not have a proper hedquarter and the members of the Council
could not do their work properly.
The
impact of the law on the political class is limited considering
that there is too much material to be studied for determining for
certain that somebody was a collaborator/agent/informer of the Securitate,
and the CNSAS will not reveal any information if it is not certain.
The law is limited by the third party restriction in that one can
not reveal/publish/use any information gathered from her/his own
file. The only positive effect that I see is that when one is able
to see her/his file it will offer a moral base for judging the others,
it is up to her/him if he/she decides to take any punitive measure
against the abusers/criminals. But to do this, the Romanian legislative
has to be completed with a judiciary system reform.
Why
has the law been passed after all? At the moment, I can make only
suppositions because I heard only politicized answers. One of the
reasons might be that the Romanian Democratic Convention, especially
PNTcd, wanted to regain its specific electorate by passing this
law, but with specific amendments that protect some of its members.
For the other parties, it represents an electoral tool too and also
a mission accomplished in order for Romania to become a democratic
country. The weaknesses of the law are not presented, the only exception
being its initiator, and the general opinion is that better to have
something than nothing. What is not seen is that a wrong law can
be used by abusers and can become a political tool, which was not
the initial intention. This law has offered a sense of justice for
the victims, protect them from being accused of revenge and clean
the political life of suspicions, blackmails and threats. A general
opinion can be sensed among the Romanian parliamentary political
parties: the problem of disclosing the Securitate was so much talked
about and Mr. Dumitrescu pushed very hard for it, that now it is
a relief it was passed with the needed limitations. This is a law
on decommunization, but how well it can function is another matter.
They did their job of discussing it, passing it, now it is up to
another branch of the power -the judiciary- to make it work. However,
the law has very weak judicial implications.
Conclusions
This
paper has tried to give an overview of the state of decommunization
in Romania. The process of decommunization in Romania has become
a political issue since the State Security Files Access Law was
passed by the Romanian Parliament and signed by the Romanian President,
Mr. Emil Constantinescu, in December 1999, ten years after the 1989
Romanian revolution. In all these years, there were attempts to
come to terms with the past, attempts coming from the ex-prisoners
of the communist prisons, from students and from intellectuals,
mostly ex-dissidents in the communist period, but they did not become
laws to govern the post-communist Romanian society. All analyses
done during these years attested that Romanian political parties
almost unanimously remained reluctant to deal with the problem of
decommunization. This is the reason for trying to find out the rationale
of adressing the issue after ten years of almost complete silence.
The
problem of decommunization was analyzed in the broader context of
the theoretical discussion on transitional justice and its judicial
mechanisms. The general theoretical pros and cons for doing justice
can be identified in the Romanian political parties’ discourses.
I could thus make a general description of the points of view using
the way the parties have been motivating the amendments to the Access
Law. The conclusion was that almost all of them accepted the importance
of the law, but some of the parties restricted the law through their
amendments and made it almost useless. The answer to the question
why now, after ten years, remains unclear. The Romanian political
parties use a politicized discourse when arguing the importance
and usefulness of this law; a sense of duty of passing it so that
Romania can become a member of the European Union can be perceived
in the politial dicourse. Specific signals conveyed by the European
institution concerning the need for such a law were not given, but
speculations can be made.
The
Access to the Personal File and the Disclosure of the Securitate
as a Political Police Law can have influence on the Romanian society
either as a moral measure balance for individuals, or as a hidden
lustration law through elections.
This
paper was first presented to the Civic Education Project, the VIII-th
International Student Conference, held in Budapest, May 2000. Any
suggestions on its content and subject are welcome to the following
email address: ioanaborza@hotmail.com
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