Will the State Security get access to the NATO secrets

by General Atanas Atanasov

General Atanasov was head of the National Security Service with the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior from 1998 to 2001.

The Classified Information Protection Act provides for the establishment of a specialised body - State Commission for the Security of Information. The members of the Commission are appointed by the Council of Ministers upon a proposal from the Prime Minister and only persons who have higher education are eligible for those positions. The educational requirement however does not exist in regard to the Prime Minister himself - a fact that would have been rather amusing if it was not such a pity. In the context of the analysis of implementation, attention should be drawn to the provisions of the Classified Information Act regulating the services' powers as regards the vetting of their own officials and job applicants. The real paradox is that the officials should carry out the vetting of their chiefs and report the results to the later. The question that should normally arise concerns the actions which an inspector from such a service can undertake if he/she comes across some facts substantiating a suspicion about his/her chief having affiliations with the past. We should accept that such facts objectively exist bearing in mind that at present there is hardly a head of a special service in Bulgaria who has not started his career in the respective structures of the communist regime. This gives us enough ground to doubt their credibility - states the Chair of the Information Security Commission - on her way back from another visit to Brussels. Not to mention those senior officials of the Ministry of the Interior and the other security services who have graduated from the Soviet Union special security services' schools.

Under the existing legislation and practice it is beyond doubt that the vetting will only be a formal one for those persons in the services who have the widest access to information with the highest level of classification. The vetting of the top level Ministry of the Interior officials now takes only a few hours, which is clearly not in compliance with the provisions of the law. There is no reporting mechanism, which can be used by the officials who are vetting their superiors and have grounds to believe that the latter do not comply with the set requirements. It is also doubtful whether the officials in question can even obtain such data, because they do not have the right to access the "human resources files" of the vetted officials. These files contain data concerning every official - why they were selected, what schools and training courses they have completed, when and why they've received awards or have been sanctioned. For example, according to the file of a recently appointed Director of a Regional Directorate of the Interior he is "suitable for the position of an officer in the National Militia, because while receiving his higher education he has aided State Security". Another issue related to the implementation of the above Act that deserves our attention is the selection of the officers for the security of information. According to the law, every public institution or legal entity working with classified information is an "organisational unit". The head of the organisational unit must appoint an officer for the security of information following a consultation with the State Commission for the Security of Information. The problem is that mainly former State Security officials apply for and are appointed at this position. Having in mind the clearly demonstrated position of the Ministry of the Interior leadership we can't expect their former colleagues from the services to deem them unreliable. Clearly there is also lack of political will - proof of this is the repealing of the Access to the Documents of the former State Security Act; the suspension of the work of the Commission responsible for its implementation; the persisting policy to appoint former State Security officials at key positions and in the units, carrying out the co-ordination and co-operation with the NATO services and the EU Member States. Another serious problem that can be identified in relation to the implementation of the said Act is the effectiveness of the control performed by the State Commission for the Security of Information in the process of creating, storing and destroying classified information. The Classified Information Protection Act provides a detailed regulation on the ways to classify information constituting state and official secret, as well as on the security levels and markings. The Act contains detailed provisions on marking procedure and protection terms and on the mechanisms to store and destroy classified information. It is important that destroying classified information is subject to State Commission for the Security of Information control. The Commission is the only body, which can give an authorisation to destroy classified information one year after the expiration of the term for information storage, specified in the security marking. With these legal regulations, are there any guarantees that effective control over the special services will be exercised by the State Commission for the Security of Information in the process of creation, storage and destroying classified information ? The practice shows that there are no mechanisms to exercise such control over the activities of the Ministry of the Interior. For the services outside the Ministry of the Interior - it is yet to be seen.

To illustrate the above situation it should be mentioned, that a 31-year-term has to expire to destroy a document marked "top secret" (highest level). That however did not prevent the present Minister of the Interior from ordering such documents, connected to the "Gnom" operation, to be destroyed within less than a year. He did not address the Commission nor did the Commission react to the grave violation of the law publicly announced by Minister Petkanov. This case is enough to cast a doubt on the effect of the Classified Information Protection Act and the effectiveness of the Commission. For a similar act general Vlado Tododrov from the reserve who worked in State Security First General Division served a sentence of imprisonment of almost a year at a time when the specified regulations did not exist nor did the Commission. The question of the criminal liability of general Asparuhov for destroying the file of agent Rumiantsev is still pending. According to the provision of Art. 39, para 1 of the Classified Information Protection Act, seven categories of persons at mandate or higher positions within the executive power and the Judiciary are exempt from vetting.

The initial text of the Law, drafted by the National Security Service at the time of the government of SDS (Union of the Democratic Forces) provided for the opportunity to have access to classified information without vetting only for the President, the Prime-Minister and the Head of the National Assembly. When the draft was submitted to the Parliament in 2002 the parliamentary majority of NDSV (National Movement Simeon II) and DPS (Movement for Rights and Liberties), supported by the MPs from Coalition for Bulgaria (coalition of the Socialist (former Communist) Party and other left-wing parties) voted for increasing the number of persons with access to classified information without vetting. It was stated that the Members of Parliament should have access to such information as they are directly elected from the people and exercise parliamentary control over the executive branch. At the same time, the requirement for vetting was completely ignored and the number of persons who have practically unlimited access to information that could affect the interests of third parties was unduly widened. Part of those categories encompasses persons with immunity against prosecution, which in practise means impunity for any misuse of classified information, including NATO information. According to the legislator carrying out activities "against the interests, which Bulgaria is obliged to protect, in accordance with the international treaties" constitutes grounds to deem a person not credible in terms of security. There is a reasonable question about the credibility of persons who have aggressively and publicly declare their position against NATO and have even supported terrorist regimes hostile to the Alliance. The logic here is that everyone can express freely his/her support or denial of certain ideas but within the vetting for access to information, connected to the security of an organization to which Bulgaria is a member, in compliance with an international agreement, vetting should be carried out in accordance with those interests.

Obviously, if this criterion was observed and an objective assessment was carried out, some Members of the Parliament would not have received access to NATO secrets. Now though they have voted regulations that exclude MPs from vetting. It will yet become clear if this would pose serious problems not only for Bulgaria but also for our partners from NATO. Another question of utmost importance is whether persons who have worked in the repressive structures of the communist regime could be deemed credible to ensure secrecy. This question is quite reasonable in view of the legal regulation stating that there should not be any facts or circumstances that may lead to extortion of the vetted person. In this regard, a concern arises from the provision of Art. 7, para 2 of the Regulation on the Implementation of the Classified Information Protection Act, stating "The security services and the services for public order may refuse to provide information in the cases where that could lead to the disclosure of a person who is an aide to the services". Therefore, the fact that a person was and aide to State Security can be concealed in the process of vetting. Access to classified information could be given to that person and due to secret affiliations with the past the information can be transmitted to circles serving outside interests. In a very "strange" way the Regulation on the Implementation adds to the Law - we can only guess what the purpose is. It is not allowed to change the philosophy and the spirit of the Law by the regulations on its implementation especially by empowering the security services and services for public order. The legislator has given to the protection of classified information through vetting a priority to the disclosure of the aiding to services. There is no logic in refusing the provision of information, as the fact of the aiding is significant for the judgement of the competent body. This argument is even more solid in the cases where the aiding happened at the time of the communist regime with all consequent affiliations. As regards the provision of Art. 7, para 2 of the Regulation on the Implementation of the Classified Information Protection Act, a serious consideration should be given to filing a complaint before the Supreme Administrative Court on the grounds of its contradiction to the Law.

"Dnevnik", 6 November 2003

Translation from Bulgarian by "Decommunization"